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Corporations-Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations Not Qualified
to Transact Business in North Carolina
In 1955 the North Carolina Legislature enacted two statutes
that govern in personam' jurisdiction over foreign corporations that
are not qualified to transact business in North Carolina.2 These
statutes concern corporations that have either transacted business in
the state or have committed some act within the state which would
1 "A proceeding in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights
and obligations brought against the person and based on jurisdiction of the
person . . ." 1 Am. Jun. 2D Actions § 39 (1962). "A proceeding in rem is
essentially a proceeding to determine the right in specific property, against
all the world, equally binding on everyone." 1 Am. JuR. 2 D Actions § 40
(1962).
2 N.C. Sess. Laws 1955, ch. 1143, § 1. These statutes were first codified
into law as N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-38.05, -38.1 (Supp. 1955) to go into
effect upon adoption. Six days later the Legislature adopted the Business
Corporation Act, N.C. Sess. Laws 1955, ch. 1371, § 1, which was not to go
into effect until July 1, 1957. When the Business Corporation Act went
into effect, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-38.05, -38.1 were recodified as N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 55-144, -145 (1960). The language was not changed.
Whenever a foreign corporation shall transact business in this State
without, first procuring a certificate of authority so to do from the
Secretary of State or after its certificate of authority shall have been
withdrawn, suspended, or revoked, then the Secretary of State shall
be an agent of such corporation upon whom any process, notice, or
demand in any suit upon a cause of action arising out of such business
may be served.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-144 (1965).
Every foreign corporation shall be subject to suit in this State, by a
resident of this State or by a person having a usual place of business
in this State, whether or not such foreign corporation is transacting
or has transacted business in this State and whether or not it is en-
gaged exclusively in interstate or foreign commerce, on any cause of
action arising as follows:
(1) Out of any contract made in this State or to be performed in
this State; or
(2) Out of any business solicited in this State by mail or otherwise
if the corporation has repeatedly so solicited business, whether the
orders or offers relating thereto were accepted within or without
this State; or
(3) Out of the production, manufacture, or distribution of goods by
such corporation with the reasonable expectation that those goods are
to be used or consumed in this State and are so used or consumed,
regardless of how or where the goods were produced, manufactured,
marketed, or sold or whether or not through the medium of indepen-
dent contractors or dealers; or
(4) Out of tortious conduct in this State, whether arising out of
repeated activity or single acts, and whether arising out of mis-
feasance or nonfeasance.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-145(a) (1965).
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subject them to jurisdiction. The North Carolina Supreme Court
recently decided cases that invoke each of the statutes.
In Byham v. National Cibo House Corp.,3 the plaintiff, a North
Carolina resident, sought rescission on grounds of fraud of a chain
restaurant franchise contract. The defendant, a Tennessee corpora-
tion, contended that the North Carolina courts did not have juris-
diction because the contract was made not in North Carolina but in
Tennessee when it was accepted in defendant's home office. The
court found that the contract was to be performed in North Caro-
lina and held that the North Carolina court had in personam juris-
diction on the basis of the minimum contact statute, section 55-
145 (a) of the Business Corporation Act.4
In Abney Mills, Inc. v. Tri-State Motor Co.,' the plaintiff, a
South Carolina corporation, was seeking damages for an alleged
breach of contract by the defendant, a Delaware corporation having
its principal place of business in Missouri. The contract, made in
South Carolina, stated the defendant would purchase a fifty-seven
per cent interest in Kilgo Motor Freight, a North Carolina corpora-
tion owned by the plaintiff and others. While awaiting approval
from the Interstate Commerce Commission, the parties to the con-
tract made an agreement that the defendant would have temporary
management control and would be substituted for Kilgo's board of
directors. The defendant's president came to North Carolina and
took over active management control of Kilgo for seven months. At
the time the transfer was to be completed, the defendant did not
have funds available to consummate the sale, and it terminated the
management control agreement. The plaintiff instituted proceedings
in the North Carolina court. The defendant contended this court
did not have jurisdiction because the action did not arise out of
any business transacted in North Carolina. The trial court dis-
missed the action. The Supreme Court remanded the suit for further
findings of facts to determine if the defendant's activities in North
Carolina were sufficient to subject it to the transacting business
'265 N.C. 50, 143 S.E.2d 225 (1965).
'There was evidence that the defendant had solicited for customers in
North Carolina by mail and in newspaper advertisements, but the court did
not mention this as a basis for jurisdiction under § 55-145 (a) (2) (business
solicited in this state). Nor did it mention § 55-145(a) (4) (tortious con-
duct in this state) concerning the defendant's alleged fraudulent representa-
tion as a basis.
265 N.C. 61, 143 S.E.2d 235 (1965).
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statute, section 55-144, and also to determine further finding of
facts concerning the locus of the breach of contract.
Historically, jurisdiction over foreign corporations has been
granted on such theories as implied consent6 or presence7 while the
corporation was doing business within the state. The modern, more
liberal view originated in International Shoe Co. v. Washington,'
a landmark decision expressing approval of a "minimum contacts
test"9 whereby it becomes unnecessary for the corporation to be
transacting business in the forum state. This theory has been held
valid when there was as little as one contact, an insurance contract
renewal, with the forum state." The Court attributed the trend
to this liberal view to improved transportation and communication.
It recognized that the burden of a party having to defend himself in
a state where he had engaged in economic activity had been re-
duced." But later, in Hanson v. Denckla,'2 the Court cautioned
that the trend did not remove all restrictions on the personal juris-
dictions of state courts.13
What, then, are the limits within which North Carolina courts
may exercise jurisdiction over corporations not qualified to transact
business in North Carolina? This is a question of whether or not
the state statute meets the due process requirement of the fourteenth
amendment and whether or not the defendant has committed the
activities designated by the statute. While a particular decision can
serve as a guide for future litigants, each holding in this area is
necessarily limited to the particular facts before the court.
Section 55-144 replaced the jurisdictional statute14 in effect prior
to 1955; the present statute uses the term "transacting business"
instead of "doing business," the term used in the earlier statute.
' See Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404 (1855).
See Barrow Steamship Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100 (1898).326 U.S. 310 (1945).
' [D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a
judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the
forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the mainte-
nance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice."
Id. at 316.
"0 McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
12 Id. at 222, 223.
1 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
23Id. at 251.
" N.C. Sess. Laws 1901, ch. 5. [Last codification was N.C. GFN STAT.
§ 55-38 (1950).]
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Only in Worley's Beverages, Inc. v. Bubble Up Corp.1" has a court
noted this substitution prior to the North Carolina Supreme Court
in Abney Mills. In Worley's the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of North Carolina said that changing the statute
from "doing business" to "transacting business" only had the effect
of liberalizing the statute.
16
Thus, it would seem that any factual situation litigated prior to
1955 that was held to constitute "doing business" would still be
good authority for "transacting business" today. However, the
authority of a decision that held the activities did not constitute
"doing business" prior to 1955 would seem to be weakened. If the
substitution did liberalize the statute, some of these activities might
conceivably be considered as "transacting business" now.
Apparently the courts have not considered the substitution of
tremendous import because later decisions still wrestle with the ques-
tion of the corporation's "doing business," making no reference to
"transacting business."' 7 But, the court has used "transacting busi-
ness" and "doing business" interchangeably.1
8
In Abney Mills the court has given a qualified definition of
"transacting business." It relied upon previous holdings in Lambert
v. Schell"0 and Ruark v. Virginia Trust Co.2 for definitions of
"' 167 F. Supp. 498 (E.D.N.C. 1958).
1'Id. at 504.
" Edwards v. Scott & Fetzer, Inc., 154 F. Supp. 41 (M.D.N.C. 1957);
Spartan Equip. Co. v. Air Placement Equip. Co., 263 N.C. 549, 140 S.E.2d
3 (1965); Babson v. Clairol, Inc., 256 N.C. 227, 123 S.E.2d 508 (1962);
Harrington v. Croft Steel Prods., Inc., 244 N.C. 675, 94 S.E.2d 803 (1956);
Housing Authority v. Brown, 244 N.C. 592, 94 S.E.2d 582 (1956). In
Harrington v. Croft Steel Prods., Inc., supra, the trial court had found
jurisdiction on the basis of §§ 55-38 and 55-38.1 (a) (1), (3) [now §
55-145(a)(1), (3)]. The court said: "We conclude the evidence before
the trial court was sufficient to support the finding the defendant was doing
business in North Carolina .... It becomes unnecessary to consider or pass
upon the constitutionality of G.S. 55-38.1(1) (3) ... ." Id. at 678, 94 S.E.2d
at 805-06. [The court, throughout the decision, referred to the statute as
G.S. 55-38.1(1)(3) instead of G.S. 55-38.1(a) (1), (3).] It is true N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 55-38 (1950) was still in effect at this time, but so was N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 55-38.05 (Supp. 1955). See text accompanying note 2, supra.
Section 55-38.05 has been mentioned in only one decision, Putnam v. Triangle
Publications, Inc., 245 N.C. 432, 96 S.E.2d 445 (1957). The court said the
plaintiff sought service of process pursuant to § 55-38.05, but in the opinion,
the court talked about why the plaintiff could not have service of process
according to § 55-381
" United States v. Atlantic Contractors, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 356 (E.D.N.C.
1964) ; Putnam v. Triangle Publications, Inc., supra note 17.
" Doing business in this State means doing some of the things or
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"doing business" and said these same definitions applied to "trans-
acting business." But, the court cautioned that these definitions
were definitely not an all-embracing rule as to the meaning of "trans-
acting business."2
Courts have pointed out that of the two statutes, section 55-144,
the transacting business statute, is the only one available to a non-
resident plaintiff or to a plaintiff that does not have a usual place
of business in North Carolina.2 The North Carolina Supreme
Court has also pointed out that to make the transacting business
statute applicable, two requirements must be met: (1) the defendant
must have transacted business in North Carolina; and (2) the cause
of action must have arisen out of such business.?
Section 55-145 (a), the minimum contact statute, grants juris-
diction in four specific instances though the corporation is not trans-
acting business in North Carolina: (1) if the corporation makes a
contract in this state or one to be performed in this state; (2) if
the corporation solicits business in this state; (3) if the corpora-
tion can reasonably expect its goods to be used in this state; or
(4) if the corporation commits a tort in this state. The statute
applies "whether or not such corporation is transacting or has trans-
acted business in this State .... ,2 However, if the corporation is
transacting business, jurisdiction would attach by virtue of the trans-
acting business statute, so for all practical purposes, the statute
need apply only in cases in which the corporation has not transacted
exercising some of the functions in this State for which the corpora-
tion was created. And the business done by it here must be of such
nature and character as to warrant the inference that the corporation
has subjected itself to the local jurisdiction and is, by its duly
authorized officers and agents, present within the State.
235 N.C. 21, 25, 69 S.E.2d 11, 13-14 (1952).
" "The expression 'doing business in this state,' . . . means engaging in,
carrying on, or exercising, in this State, some of the things, or some' of
the functions, for which the corporation was created." 206 N.C. 564, 565,
174 S.E. 441, 442 (1934).
21265 N.C. at 71, 143 S.E.2d at 242.
"United States v. Atlantic Contractors, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 356 (E.D.N.C.
1964); Schnur & Cohan, Inc. v. McDonald, 220 F. Supp. 9 (M.D.N.C.
1963). Bitt see Belk v. Belk's Dep't Store, Inc., 250 N.C. 99, 108 S.E.2d
131 (1959). The plaintiff was a resident of Florida and the defendant was
a South Carolina corporation. The court found jurisdiction on the basis of
International Shoe and did not mention any statute.
"Abney Mills, Inc. v. Tri-State Motor Co., 265 N.C. 61, 143 S.E.2d
235 (1965); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. 3. B. Hunt & Sons, 260 N.C.
717, 133 S.E.2d 644 (1963).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-145(a) (1965).
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business in North Carolina.25 Nevertheless, if the corporation has
not transacted business, the rule of the "minimum contacts test"
must be met to assure that due process is satisfied.
The court in Byhain set forth the factors it will consider in
determining if the "minimum contacts test" and "fair play" re-
quired in International Shoe have been met.28 These are:
(a) Did the form of substituted service reasonably assure that
notice to the defendant would be actual ?27
(b) Did the defendant do some act invoking the benefits as well
as the burdens of the forum state's laws ?28
(c) Did the forum state have an interest of its residents to pro-
tect ?2
(d) Did the defendant have access to the courts of the forum
state to enforce obligations of its residents ?3
(e) Was the defendant caused great inconvenience in defending
a suit away from home ?31
(f) Were the witnesses and material evidence to be found in the
forum state? 32
(g) Would it be economically practical for plaintiff to pursue
his suit in defendant's home state ?33
(h) If the suit was based on a contract, did it have a substantial
connection with the forum state?
34
"It is possible that a corporation could be transacting one type of busi-
ness in North Carolina and another type in State A. If the plaintiff brings
suit in North Carolina because defendant manufactured goods in State A
that it could reasonably expect to be used in North Carolina, his suit would
have to be brought under § 55-145(a) (3) instead of § 55-144. Under §
55-144, the cause of action must arise out of the business transacted in
North Carolina. In this hypothetical the business transacted in North Caro-
lina has no connection with plaintiff's cause of action, so it is conceivable
that a corporation admittedly transacting business within the state would be
subject to § 55-145(a). It is obvious that this is a possibility that will
rarely occur.
265 N.C. at 56-57, 143 S.E.2d at 231-32.
87 See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) ; Inter-
national Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
" See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958) ; International Shoe Co.
v. Washington, supra note 27.
"0 See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) ; Travel-
ers Health Ass'n v. Virginia ex rel. State Corp. Comm'n, 339 U.S. 643
(1950).
0 See Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia ex ret. State Corp. Comm'n,
supra note 29.
8 See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
" See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957);
Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia ex rel. State Corp. Comm'n, 339 U.S.
643 (1950).
"See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., supra note 32.
"Ibid.
[Vol. 44
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(i) How much authority has been given the courts by the legis-
lature of the forum state ?5
The court deems (a), (b) and (i) essential to meet due process
requirements, while consideration will be given to (c), (d), (e),
(f), (g) and (h)-3 Factor (d) seems to be redundant in that it is
included in (b). Factors (e), (f) and (g) are the hardship criteria
as they affect the defendant, the claimant, or the witnesses and
material evidence. Actually these factors seem to be more related
to making a determination of whether or not the doctrine of forum
non conveniens applies than they d6 to determine whether or not
jurisdiction has attached. Since a liberal trend in jurisdiction is
evolving, these factors should have a lessening weight in the ulti-
mate determination because of decreasing hardships. But they
should certainly be considered to prevent gross miscarriages of jus-
tice.
Subsection (1) (contract made or to be performed in this state)
of section 55-145(a), the minimum contact statute, has been held
valid as the sole basis for granting jurisdiction to North Carolina
courts,3 7 as have subsections (3) (reasonable expectation goods will
be used in this state)3 8 and (4) (tortious conduct in this state)."
The courts have yet to rule on the validity of subsection (2) (busi-
ness solicited in this state) alone as a basis for jurisdiction, but
they have held it valid in conjunction with one of the other sub-
sections in some cases."
" See Perkins v. Benquet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952);
Nixon v. Cohn, 62 Wash. 2d 987, 385 P.2d 305 (1963); Gavenda Bros. v.
Elkins Limestone Co., 145 W. Va. 732, 116 S.E.2d 910 (1960).
265 N.C. at 56, 143 S.E.2d at 231.
8 Byham v. National Cibo House Corp., 265 N.C. 50, 143 S.E.2d 225
(1965) (contract for franchise for chain restaurant).
88 Shepard v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 249 N.C. 454, 106 S.E.2d 704 (1959)
(home appliance manufacturer could reasonably expect products to be used
in state).
" Painter v. Home Fin. Co., 245 N.C. 576, 96 S.E.2d 731 (1957). The
defendant was guilty of wrongfully taking plaintiff's automobile by duress
without any legal process or right, and of invading plaintiff's privacy
causing public humiliation.
"°Worley's Beverages, Inc. v. Bubble Up Corp., 167 F. Supp. 498
(E.D.N.C. 1958); Farmer v. Ferris, 260 N.C. 619, 133 S.E.2d 492 (1963).
In Worley's the court found jurisdiction on basis of §§ 55-144, -145 (a) (1)-
(3). The defendant's representatives had personally solicited the plaintiff to
handle defendant's product in North Carolina. In Farmer the court found
jurisdiction on the basis of § 55-145 (a) (1)- (4). The defendant had solicited
its orders by advertisements in Billboard magazine and also had sent mimeo-
graphed lists of products for sale to customers in North Carolina.
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It has been held unconstitutional to apply subsection (3) to the
facts of a particular case on two occasions, 41 and in conjunction
with subsection (4) on one occasion.42 Subsection (4) has been
", Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502 (4th
Cir. 1956); Putnam v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 245 N.C. 432, 96 S.E.2d
445 (1957). In Putnam the plaintiff, a North Carolina resident, sued the
defendant, a Delaware corporation having its principal place of business in
Pennsylvania, for libel and invasion of privacy for an article in defendant's
magazine. The defendant had sold the magazines to independent whole-
salers in North Carolina, but title had passed outside the state. Defendant's
only contact with North Carolina was that three of its representatives
entered North Carolina two to five times a year to promote sales to news
dealers and television stations. The court held that the defendant did not
have sufficient ties with North Carolina to satisfy due process requirements
and that N.C. GrEN. STAT. § 55-38.1(a) (3) [now § 55-145(a) (3)] would
be unconstitutional if applied to the facts in this case. Id. at 443, 96 S.E.2d
at 454. The court in Worley's said that did not mean that the statute would
not be constitutional under a different set of facts. 167 F. Supp. at 505-06.
For a criticism of the court's decision in Putnam, see 7 DuKE L.J. 135
(1958). In Erlanger Mills the plaintiff, a North Carolina corporation,
placed an order with the defendant, a New York corporation having its
principal place of business in New York, for some yarn after plaintiff's
representative visited the defendant's mill in New York. The contract was
accepted in New York and the goods were shipped f. o. b. New York.
Plaintiff found some defective yarn in the shipment and sued to recover
damages. The defendant's only contact with North Carolina was that its
general manager came to plaintiff's plant in North Carolina to discuss the
complaint. Service was made on the general manager while he was here
and not through the Secretary of State as prescribed in § 55-146. The court
held that to sustain jurisdiction would be offensive to the due process clause.
239 F.2d at 507. Judge Sobeloff posed this hypothetical:
To illustrate the logical and not too improbable extension of the
problem, let us consider the hesitancy a California dealer might feel
if asked to sell a set of tires to a tourist with Pennsylvania license
plates, knowing that he might be required to defend in the courts of
Pennsylvania a suit for refund of the purchase price or for heavy
damages in case of accident attributed to a defect in the tires. As in
the hypothetical case, the sale in the principal case was "with the
reasonable expectation that these goods are to be used or consumed in
[the vendee's domicile] and are so used and consumed." It is difficult
to conceive of a more serious threat and deterrent to the free flow of
commerce between the states.
Ibid.
"Moss v. City of Winston-Salem, 254 N.C. 480, 119 S.E.2d 445 (1961).
The plaintiff, a North Carolina resident, was injured by an object thrown
by a lawn mower manufactured by the defendant, an Illinois corporation
with its principal place of business in Illinois. The lawn mower was being
used by a city employee., The manufacturing defendant had sold the mower
to a distributor and independent contractor in Virginia, who had in turn
sold it to a retail dealer in Winston-Salem, who in turn had sold it to
the city. The manufacturing defendant had no representatives in North
Carolina and had never been present in North Carolina. The court said
the defendant had no contacts with North Carolina that would make it
amenable to process from the courts of North Carolina, based on the Putain
decision. Id. at 484, 119 S.E.2d at 448.
[Vol. 44
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held unconstitutionally applied to particular facts in only one case.4
Occasionally the court is faced with a jurisdictional claim based
on both the transacting business statute and the minimum contact
statute and has decided on the "transacting business" basis, refusing
to consider the constitutionality of the subsections of section 55-
145 (a).44
Only two cases holding application of the statutes to the partic-
ular facts of the cases unconstitutional have been decided by the
North Carolina Supreme Court." On the other hand, in every case
except one4" that has been decided in a federal court, sufficient "mini-
mum contacts" have been held to be lacking4 7 or the defendant
corporation has been deemed not to be "transacting business."4
This indicates that the North Carolina Supreme Court is more ready
to grant jurisdiction to protect North Carolina residents, quite
naturally, and that it has taken the supposedly liberal interpretation
" Easterling v. Cooper Motors, Inc., 26 F.R.D. 1 (M.D.N.C. 1960). The
plaintiff, a North Carolina resident, was injured because of the alleged
negligence of the defendant, a South Carolina corporation with its principal
place of business in South Carolina, in repairing her car. Defendant's
contacts with North Carolina were occasional visits to the Chrysler assembly
plant in North Carolina to see new automobiles, for which he was a dealer,
and telephoning or writing the regional office in North Carolina. The
court said to sustain jurisdiction would be offensive to the due process
clause, relying on the Erlanger Mills case. Id. at 3.
" Spartan Equip. Co. v. Air Placement Equip. Co., 263 N.C. 549, 140
S.E.2d 3 (1965); Babson v. Clairol, Inc., 256 N.C. 227, 123 S.E.2d 508
(1962); Harrington v. Croft Steel Prods., Inc., 244 N.C. 675, 94 S.E.2d
803 (1956), see note 17 supra. In Spartan Equip. Co. the trial court found
that jurisdiction could be had on the basis of § 55-145(a)(1)-(4), but the
appellate court ignored the applicability of § 55-145 (a) and found that the
defendant was "doing business" in North Carolina. 263 N.C. at 556, 140
S.E.2d at 9. The court made no mention of "transacting business" in the
opinion, but did refer to § 55-144. When referring to International Shoe,
the court referred to "continuous and systematic activities" instead of "mini-
mum contacts." Ibid.
"' Moss v. City of Winston-Salem, 254 N.C. 480, 119 S.E.2d 445 (1961);
Putnam v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 245 N.C. 432, 96 S.E.2d 445 (1957).
In Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. J. B. Hunt & Sons, 260 N.C. 717, 133 S.E.2d
644 (1963), the court did not grant jurisdiction because the alleged tort was
committed in Virginia instead of North Carolina, so the North Carolina
statute was not applicable.
" Worley's Beverages, Inc. v. Bubble Up Corp., 167 F. Supp. 498
(E.D.N.C. 1958).
•' Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502 (4th Cir.
1956); Easterling v. Cooper Motors, Inc., 26 F.R.D. 1 (M.D.N.C. 1960).
8 United States v. Atlantic Contractors, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 356 (E.D.N.C.
1964); Schnur & Cohan, Inc. v. McDonald, 220 F. Supp. 9 (M.D.N.C.
1963); Edwards v. Scott & Fetzer, Inc., 154 F. Supp. 41 (M.D.N.C. 1957).
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offered by International Shoe more to heart than have the federal
courts.
The drafters of the Business Corporation Act intended that the
local residents should have as much protection as possible.
It is thought the wise policy favors subjecting such foreign cor-
porations to suit here for the convenience of residents of this
state where it is constitutionally possible, since the alternative is
to force our residents to bring their actions in foreign jurisdic-
tions.49
While the decisions in the Byham and Abney Mills cases are not
earth-shaking deviations from a trend, the guidelines furnished by
the North Carolina Supreme Court as to what it considers to be
"transacting business" in section 55-144 and what constitutes "mini-
mum contacts" in allowing jurisdiction under section 55-145 (a) are
useful. Nevertheless, the basic problem of applying these concepts to
the particular activities of the defendant corporation will continue
to confront the court. It is inconceivable that this problem can be
alleviated by substitution of legal rule for ad hoc judgment.
HAROLD D. COLSTON
Criminal Law-Credit for Time Served Under a Vacated Judgment
Upon Retrial and Second Conviction
In the recent case of State v. Weaver' the North Carolina Su-
preme Court reversed its former position and allowed the time
served in prison by the defendant prior to his collateral attack upon
the previous proceedings and subsequent retrial and conviction, to
count toward his prison sentence resulting from his second trial.'
Defendant was first tried in May 1963 and pleaded nolo con-
tendere to a charge of felonious assault.3 He was sentenced to
imprisonment for a term of not less than five or more than seven
"' Latty, Powers & Breckenridge, The Proposed North Carolina Business
Corporation Act, 33 N.C.L. REv. 26, 54 (1954). (Emphasis added.)
1264 N.C. 681, 142 S.E.2d 633 (1965).
2 Id. at 687, 142 S.E.2d at 637.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-32 (1953) provides:
Any person who assaults another with a deadly weapon with the
intent to kill, and inflicts serious injury not resulting in death, shall
be guilty of a felony and shall be punished by imprisonment in the
state prison or be worked under the supervision of the State Highway
and Public Works Commission for a period of not less than four
months nor more than ten years.
[Vol. 44
